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It! THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
!J.?,1lK OF EPHRAHI, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY 
STEINI1AN:N, BABYLON CORPOR-
ATION, PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL 
SAVINGS, FIRST STATE BANK, 
THE UTAH TAX CO~~ISSION, and 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
BABYLON CORPORATION 
Case No. 14514 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant Bank of Ephraim appeals from a decision 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court as to the priorities 
of certain judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court awarded judgment on a Decree of 
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim, 
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
?1ssociation and the Utah State Tax Commission, as per the 
complaints of each creditor. The rights of the defendant 
Steinmann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon 
Curporation. The defendants, First State Bank and United 
l. 
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States of America, were previously dismissed as parties 
defendant to the action. 
In its Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the Distri:· 
Court, in addition to awarding judgments to the judgment 
creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments of ea~ 
creditor, as set forth in the appellant's StatementofFact. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to sustain the entry of judgment and 
priorities as set forth in the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, re· 
spondent substantially accepts the Statement of Facts of 
ap!Jellant, with several clarifications and additions as fol· 
lm•TS: 
l. Appellee Babylon Corporation has interest only in 
the cafe property. Babylon Corporation obtained this inter: 
by assignment from Steven Kaye Steinmann. 
2. The mortgage that Halbert Davis gave to Steinmann:.: 
given the same day that the Bank of Ephraim note was give~· 
August 7, 1970. (See defendant's Exhibit #5). 
3. The Steinmann mortgage \vas recorded after the Ba~\ 
Ephraim mortgage, but on the same day - August 10, 1970. 
defendant's Exhibit #3). At the time of the recordation o: 
' · h d dvanced on. the Steinmann mortgage, the BanK of Ephralm a a 
$2400.00 on the Bank of Ephraim note. . dvan"ed: Any monles a " 
the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property over and above 
2. 
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were advanced after the recordation of the Steinmann mortgage, 
and were purely optional. (Appellant's Brief, p. 9). 
4. The Steinmann mortgage was recorded at the request 
of Tibbs & Tervort, who then were counsel for the appellant, 
Bank of Ephraim. (See defendant's Exhibit *3). The fact that 
the deed was prepared by the escrow department of the Bank of 
Ephraim, and was recorded at the request of counsel for the 
appellant is important in establishing that as of August 10, 
1970, the appellant had actual notice of the Steinmann mortgage. 
5. As stated by the appellant, "the mortgage to Steven 
Kaye Steinmann expressly sets forth the fact that it was 
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim." What the 
appellant failed to mention is that the Steinmann mortgage 
expressly sets forth that it be second in lien priority to the 
Bank of Ephraim mortgage in the amount of $2400.00. 
dant's Exhibit *3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT BANK OF EPHRAIM HAS NO BASIS 
IN LAW OR IN FACT FOR ITS APPEAL AGAINST 
THE APPELLEE, BABYLON CORPORATION. 
(De fen-
Throughout its arguments, appellant addresses itself to 
appellee Prudential Federal Savings, and only in the closing 
one-half page is Babylon Corporation even mentioned. Appellant 
would have the Court believe that the facts of the Babylon 
mortgage are in relevant parts similar to the facts of the 
Prudential mortgage. Such is not the case. The Babylon mort-
gage differs from the Prudential mortgage in two very important 
3. 
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respects. First, the Bank of Ephraim had actual noti~c 
the Babylon mortgage, and thus was put on notice of ali;· 
superior to its future optional advances. Second, all a:· 
vances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property 
1
, 
made after the giving of the Steinmann mortgage. As wiL 
pointed out below, these two fact differences render ina~;. 
cable all of the appellant's arguments as appellant wooU 
have the Court apply them to Babylon Corporation. Indeed, 
the cases cited by the appellant support conclusively the 
posi~ion of the appellee, Babylon Corporation. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE BANK OF EPHRAIM HAD ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF THE BABYLON NORTGAGE, AND ALL 
OF THE APPELLANT'S ADVANCES WERE MADE 
AFTER THE RECORDATION OF THE BABYLON 
MORTGAGE, THE BABYLON LIEN HAS PRIORITY 
OVER ANY NONIES OPTIONALLY ADVANCED BY 
THE BANK OF EPHRAIM. 
The appellant has admitted from the beginning that thi 
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and not 
obligatory under the mortgage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 9). 
Autiwri ty almost universally advises that such advances, lif' 
given after notice of subsequent interests, do not haw 
p:::-iority over such subsequent interests. The universal rui• 
is quoted quite succinctly in Leche v. Ponca City Prod~ 
Crecit Association, 478 P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1970): 
"The applicable rule of law is stated in 
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, §234: 'The greater 
array of authority, however, is found on 
the side of the doctrine that advances 
made after notice of subsequent interests 
4. 
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do not have priority over such inter-
ests. This rule has been applied to 
subsequent liens and encumbrances as 
well as to subsequent grants of the 
property. The mere specification in 
the senior mortgage that the further 
advances are not to exceed a fixed sum 
does not vary the rule. The rule is 
especially applicable where the ad-
vancements are optional with the 
mortgagee ... ' 
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §230, at 299, 
the rule is stated: 'In accordance 
with the general rule, after notice of 
the attaching of a junior lien, the 
senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be 
protected in making further advances 
under his mortgage given to secure such 
advances, at least where he was under 
no binding engagement to make such ad-
vances.'" 
The above cited case is not a materials men case, yet it 
does come down strongly to support Babylon's position. 
Other courts almost universally agree. In Kimmel v. Batty, 
168 Colo. 431, 451 P.2d 751, 753 (1969), the Supreme Court of 
Colorado approves of the rule that " ... if it is optional with 
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances, he will be pro-
tected by the security of his mortgage only as to ~advances 
made before the attaching of the junior lien or encumbrance." 
(emphasis added) . 
The Supreme Court of \vashington, in National Bank of Wash-
ington v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 29 
(1973), also strongly agrees: 
"Thus, we are adhering to what we per-
ceive to be the weight of authority ... 
Optional advances under a construction 
loan agreement attach when the advances 
5. 
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are actually made. Anj liens attach-
ing prior to an optional advance would 
thus be superior to it, and attaching 
afterwards, junior to it." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also come down on point: 
"A senior mortgage for future advances 
will maintain seniority for advances 
made after actual notice of a junior 
lien if, but only if, there was a con-
tractual obligation to make such ad-
vances existing prior to the notice of 
the junior lien." Biersdorff v. Brum-
field, 93 Ida. 569, 468 P.2d 301, 302 
TI97Dl. 
The appellant cites Savings & Loan Society v. Burnett, 
106 Cal. 514, 39 P. 922, 926 (1895) as being controlling. 
that case, quoting from Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 387, : 
641 (1888), the California Court states: 
"But the lien of the mortgage cannot 
be enforced against subsequent encum-
brances, of which the mortgagee has 
actual notice for advances or endorse-
ments made or given after such notice." 
A review of other cases cited by the appellant indicae' 
that Imva, Indiana and Alabama, as well as virtually all ( 
jurisdictions, support the position that optional advance' 
a prior lienholder, after that prior lienholder has been'· 
notice of subsequent interests, do not have priority ave:;. 
subsequent interests. (See Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa~;: 
210 NW 559 (1926); Corn Belt Trust & Savings Bank of~ 
Plaine v. May, 19 7 I ow a 54 , 19 6 N\'l 7 3 5 (19 2 4 ) ; ~ 
Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 NE 335, 337 (1897); ~ 
lvarehouse Co. v. Barnett Bros., 273 Ala. 435, 137 so. i; 
(1931); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 
253, 255 (1941)). 
6. 
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In reaching this rule of law, the courts have followed 
good sound reasoning and policy. If the courts allowed a 
first mortgage holder to make optional advances with priority 
ad infinitum, even after receiving notice of a second mort-
gageholder's interest, it would spell the death of the second 
mortgage. In the instant case, it should be obvious to the 
Court that the Babylon-Steinmann mortgage would not have been 
accepted for security if Steinmann had known that the Bank of 
Ephraim would attempt to take priority on all future optional 
advances, totally contrary to the law. The appellant Bank of 
Ephraim indicates that any future lienholders have the re-
sponsibility of ascertaining the true amount of indebtedness 
outstanding at the time that the second mortgage is put into 
effect - even \vhen the amount cannot be determined from the 
face of the mortgage (Appellant's Brief, p. ll). This is 
true, and Steinmann took all possible steps to protect her-
self, by indicating that her mortgage was second to that of 
the Bank of Ephraim in the amount of $2400.00. (The exact 
amount already advanced) . Bank of Ephraim, being the escrow 
agent in the Steinmann transaction, had actual notice of the 
above restriction. Therefore, in law and in policy, Bank 
of Ephraim should not receive priority over Steinmann-Babylon 
for any monies advanced after notice and recordation of the 
Steinmann-Babylon mortgage. 
The Court '.-Jill note that the above panoply of law indicates 
that the Babylon Corporation should receive priority for all 
amounts over the $2400.00 already advanced at the time of the 
7. 
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Steinmann-Babylon mortgage, rather than amounts over $}O 
00 .• 
as decided in the court below. Although Babylon Corporat· I 
10.11 
did raise this point in the court below, it has not proferre 
t.'l.is point as a grounds for appeal and, therefore, does not 
ask for reversal of the lower court's judgment. I 
POINT III 
THE INCLUSION IN THE BANK OF EPHRAIM 
MORTGAGE OF THE TYPEWRITTEN PHRASE 
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED 
$3000.00" LIMITS THE BANK'S PRIORITY 
AND RECOVERY ON THE MORTGAGE TO 
$3000.00. 
Although the multiplicity of authority under Point II 
should suffice to obtain the results for which the appellee, 
Babylon Corporation, asks, there is also solid authority w\:: 
indicates that the $3000.00 limitation typed onto the Banko:/ 
Ephraim mortgage also may be conclusive. 
Appella..1t contends that the printed word in paragraph i 
of the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, wherein it states "and for 
i 
all of which this mortgage shall stand as a continuing secu::! 
until paid" should supercede the large typed statement lhat 
"this mortgase covers all additional advances on this loan, 
1 
the total principal amount not to exceed $3000.00." The 
typed statement is obviously a limitation on the mortgage 
security, and is irreconcilable with any statements which•;: 
allow unlimited security. 
h Ppe1·1 The Bc-,r.~:. of Ephraim mortgage was prepared by t e a '1 
lant., and thus should be construed most strongly against i':l 
" ... In case of uncertainty as to the 
meaning of a contract, it should be 
construed most strictly against its 
framer ... " (Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 
U.2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965) l. 
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Additionally, 
"Where there is a printed form of a 
contract, and other words are inserted, 
in writing or otherwise, it is to be 
assumed that they take precedence over 
the printed matter." (Holland v. Brown, 
15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 78 (1964)). 
In the same light, Steven Kaye Steinmann was justified, 
when reviewing the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, to believe that 
the written (typed) word would take precedence over any am-
biguous printed statements. A mortgage cannot be both "for 
any other indebtedness at any time existing from the mortgagor 
to the mortgagee," and limited in principal amount "not to 
exceed $3000.00," unless the total debt outstanding is always 
$3000.00 or less. Because of the typed clause in the instant 
case, once the principal amount reaches $3000.00, any addi-
tional advances would not be secured under the mortgage. 
A fine Utah case in point is General Mills, Inc. v. 
Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943), in which a unan-
imous decision was rendered, and has stood the test of time of 
over 33 years. In the General Mills case, there was a chattel 
mortgage securing the mortgagors' obligation to pay for turkey 
feed, drawn by the mortgagee. That mortgage contained two 
clauses which are amazingly similar to the clauses in question 
in the instant case. First, in the body of the printed mort-
c;age, it is stated that the mortgage was security for "all 
other sums no'd or hereafter due or owing from the mortgagors 
to the mortgagee." Closely following was the limit "provided, 
hu11ever, that the ma::imum amount, the payment of which is to 
9. 
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be secured hereby, is $3750.00." The court decided thatbot: 
clauses could not be operative; that there was an irrec . I 
onc11-, 
able ambiguity, and therefore rules of construction and inte) 
were to be followed. Quoting from the text of the opinion 
page 1093: 
"It is so elementary that an ambiguity 
in a ·,ritten instrument is construed more 
strongly against the party who drew the 
instrument that citation of authorities 
should be unnecessary. This is especially 
so where the one drafting the instrument 
has the advantage of a lender of money." 
(emphasis added) . 
After a thorough consideration of law and policy, the 
court finally stated, at 1094, that: 
"We are constrained to hold from a con-
sideration of the language of the con-
tract in its entirety, the contract res 
and the relation of the parties to each 
other, that the parties intended by their 
agreement to enter into a chattel mort-
gage to secure the sum of not to exceed 
$3750.00 by a lien ... " 
The similarities in the two cases are striking. Bothe 
involved mortgages. In both cases the mortgagee prepared t/.1 
mortgage papers. Both cases have an 'unlimited' security c!: 
as well as a 'limiting' clause. The law in Utah is clear. 
there is a limiting clause in a mortgage, "the mortgage inw: 
is in fact for an liquidated amount with a maximum ... " (GI' 
Mills, supra, at 1093). 
As applied to the case at bar, the General Nills case 
clearly indicates :hat any priori ties that the appellant Bali 
of Ephraim could have on the secured cafe property stop at 
$3000.00, as indicated on the fact of the mortgage. To gra:· 
1 r cut: more would be going against at least 33 years of c ea-
10. 
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la'.v, as well as policy which dictates that arr.biguities in 
";r'. tten instrurr.ents (and in particular, recorded instruments 
designed to give notice) should be construed most strongly 
against the preparer of the instrument. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant argues almost exclusively against Pruden-
tial Federal Savings, and never comes on point against the 
aopellee Babylon Corporation. As extensively cited in Point 
II, the universal rule is that advances given after notice 
of subsequent interests do not have priority over such sub-
sequent interest. Finally, the $3000.00 express limit as 
typed onto the face of the mortgage limits any priorities of 
t~e Bank of Ephraim under the mortgage of $3000.00. Both ex-
tensive law and common sense policy dictate that the judgment 
of the lower court should be affirmed in its entirety as it 
applies to the appellee Babylon Corporation. 
Respectf~lly submi~~~, 
') 
/ -l_.....-· 
J / I / , - ; /_ ,_.- L-_..// 
s. lRex L'ewis·, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Babylon Corporatio~ 
120 East 300 North 1 
Provo, Utah 84601 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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foregoing Brief to Louis G. Tervort, Attorney for Plaint1:;. 
Appellant, 50 North l'!ain, :•!anti, Utah 84642, and to \'layn~ :. 
Petty, Moyle & Draper, Attorneys for Prudential Federal Sa·;. 
ings & Loan, No. 15 East First South, Salt Lake City, u:a~ 
84111, and to Bruce M. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, andto 
Udell R. Jensen, Attorney for Halbert Davis, 125 South aa~:, 
I 
/ / 
1///// 
\ _ ___. 
Nephi, Utah 84648, this 6th day of August, 1976. 
/ 
/. /_..r ~' ," ~ 
12. 
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